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1. INTRODUCTION
The most practised model of aggregate labour market flows is the matching or  hiring
function. The matching function can be considered as a production function of matches or
hires. It describes the technology of how  the flow of job matches is related to the stock of
job searchers and the stock of available jobs, much  as a standard production function
describes the technological relation between the flow of products  and the stocks of produc-
tion factors.  There have been numerous efforts to specify and estimate matching functions
for a number of countries. Cf. Pissarides (1986),  Blanchard and Diamond  (1989),  Layard  et
al. (1991),  Van Ours (1991,1995),  Burda and Wyplosz (1994).
In the theoretical matching literature, job vacanties and unemployed workers are matched,
yielding the flow of matches, i.e. the flow of unemployed persons  finding  employment. See,
e.g. Pissarides (1990). In empirical studies of the matching functions, job matches are
approximated by the flow of persons  out  of unemployment. However,  while most of this
outflow wil1 involve the filling of a job, there may also  be a number of unemployed who
move out  of the labour force. In order to counteract this flaw, in some studies only the flow
of male unemployed is taken, under the assumption that the flow of unemployed moving out
of the labour force mainly consists of women. Other studies use the total hires as an
approximation for the number of matches. But hires not only include unemployed finding  a
job, also  the flow of persons  out  of the labour force, like school-leavers, to a job and the
flow of employed workers moving to another job, are included here. This means  that no
longer job vacanties and unemployed job searchers are matched, but instead vacanties and
al1 job searchers. The same applies to the flow of tilled vacanties, which sometimes is used
to approximate the tlow of matches. Vacanties  are not necessarily filled by unemployed job
searchers alone, they are open for any  job searchers alike. So also  in this case, the pool of
unemployed job searchers in the matching function should be replaced by the pool of al1 job
searchers. Despite al1 these different measures, in practically all studies job matches are
related to the stock of unemployed and the stock of vacanties in the matching function.
However,  it is by now well-established  that the workers moving from one job to another and
not the unemployed constitute  the larger part of the flow into employment. All these
different measures for the flow of matches related to unemployment and vacanties, give
different values for the elasticities in the matching function. These elasticities are relevant
for economie  policy measures. In The netherlands they may be used to tackle the problem of
low labour participation. What is the effect of an increase in (unemployed) job searchers on
the flow of job matches? Wil1  increased unemployed job search enhance employment?
This paper shows that different measures of job matches and their corresponding stock of
job searchers, does result in different matching elasticities. Estimation of matching functions
for The Netherlands, where  these different measures are used, supports our point. Using the
outflow of unemployed to a.job  gives a higher matching elasticity with respect to unemploy-
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ment than using the flow of filled vacanties.
The paper is organized as fellows. The next section is about the importante  of conformity of
the stocks in the matching process and the flow of job matches. Section 3 proves that
different measures of job matches give different matching elasticities. Estimates of the
matching function, based on different measures of job matches and using pooled cross-
section data on six sectors in The netherlands economy  from 1988.2-1994.4, are presented
Section 4 and finally  Section 5 concludes.
2. JOB SEARCHERS AND JOB MATCHES
The process of matching workers and jobs is not an instantaneous process. Each  worker and
firm are engaged in a time-consuming (stochastic) process of waiting for and looking for an
appropriate match. The matching process is formalized by the matching function, which
gives the flow of new hires from some pool of job searchers as a function of that same pool
of job searchers and the pool of available job vacanties.
F = cM(S,V), (1)
where  F is the flow of job searchers being matched  to a job, M is the matching function, S
is the stock of job searchers, V is the stock of available job vacanties, and c is a scale
parameter. For the sake of reasoning, we assume time to be continuous.
This matching function is analogous to an aggregate production function. It shows that
labour market flows generate  delays in the fïnding  of both jobs and workers, even when  the
matching process is very  efficient. The efficiency of the matching process is represented by
c in (1). Changes in the value of c Capture changes  in the geographic and ski11  characteristics
of workers and jobs or other differences between the two, as wel1  as differences in search
behaviour between job searchers.
Most of the empirical studies of the matching function are hampered by the fact  that the
flow of persons  moving to a job do not always originate from the pool of job searchers in
the matching function. In almost  ah studies, the pool of job searchers equals the stock of
unemployed. In that case, ideally, the flow of matches should equal the flow of hires from
unemployment. However,  some studies approximate the flow of matches by the total hires.
In this case the matches include much  more than just the flow from unemployment into
employment. Many  vacanties are filled by workers moving from one job to another. In
addition, a substantial part of the vacanties are filled by the flow of persons  out  of the
labour force to a job, mostly school-leavers. So in this case, the stock of job searchers is
much  larger than the stock of unemployed. On the other hand, the job being filled does not
necessarily have to be a vacancy. It can be an idle job or the unemployed can start her own
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business, etc. So also  the stock of available jobs is probably larger man the stock of
vacanties. This latter argument does not apply when  the flow of filled vacanties are used  as
an approximation of the Aow of matches. Here, the pool of available jobs is indeed  the stock
of vacanties. However,  a vacancy does not necessarily have to be fïlled by an unemployed
job searcher. Employed job searchers and job searchers out  of the labour force may equally
wel1  fill a vacancy. Hence, the pool of job searchers is, also  in this case, much  larger than
just the stock of unemployed. Nevertheless, in al1 empirical studies, where  matches are total
hires or  filled vacanties, unemployment is assumed to be sufftcient to represent the job
searchers in the matching function. Cf. e.g. Blanchard and Diamond  (1989),  Van Ours
(1991),  Gorter and Van Ours (1994).
Many  other studies use the outflow out  of unemployment to approximate the flow of
matches. This means  that the actual flow of job matches by unemployed is overestimated,
because no account is being taken of the unemployed moving out  of the labour force.
Sometimes, one tries to prevent this flaw by applying only the male outflow out  of unem-
ployment, assuming that mostly female unemployed move out  of the labour force. Cf.
Pissarides (1986),  Layard  et al. (1991),  Burda and Wyplosz (1994). Also  in this case, the
persons  moving out  of unemployment do not necessarily fill a vacancy. Unreported
vacanties (idle jobs) and the fact  that many  unemployed may start-up their own business,
means  that the pool of available jobs is underestimated.
The fact  that in many  studies the measure of job matches on the one hand does not corre-
spond to the origin of the workers filling the job and the origin of the available jobs on the
other hand. may bias the elasticity of the matching process  with respect to the pool of job
searchers and vacanties. Table 1 presents a comparison of studies of the matching function
for a number of countries and shows the relation between certain measures of job matches
and the values of the matching elasticity. It presents the dependent variable in (1) and
shows the range of measures used to represent this flow of matches. It also  reports the
frequency of the data and the elasticities of matching with respect to the stock of job
searchers, usually unemployed, and vacanties.
Table 1 shows a dichotomy for the values of the matching elasticity with respect to
unemployment, (Y, and the measure of job matches. When  the dependent variable is the
outflow of unemployed (UO)  or  the hires from unemployed (HU), the value of cr>O.S.  On
the other hand, if the dependent variable is the total hires (IJ),  the flow of filled vacanties
(F) or  the hires from employment (HE), we tind a<OS.  The value of CY  for the flow from
persons  not in the labour force (HO) is ambiguous.
* Table 1 somewhere here *
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The flow of matches is in principle  a continuous variable. The frequency of the data used to
estimate the matching function should be of a high frequency in order to take account of this
flow character. Therefore, in many  studies monthly and quarterly data were used. However,
for The Netherlands, only adequate annual data were available, so far. In particular, the
annual flows of vacanties are large in proportion to the stock. The average  vacancy duration
is about two months. The duration of unemployment is about one year. In this light, it seems
more appropriate to estimate the matching function with quarterly data than with annual
data.
The quarterly data set we use has the advantage that the measures of job matches that are
available, the flow of unemployed to a job and the flow of filled vacanties,  can be linked to
the  correct stocks of job searchers and available jobs. We only need to assume that the
unemployed find a job only by filling a vacancy. Hence, there is no job finding  via idle jobs
(unreported vacanties) or starting ones  own business. Second,  we assume that the total stock
of job searchers, who  are eligible to fill any  vacancy, consists of unemployed job searchers
and of job searchers with a job and job searchers not in the labour force. We distinguish
unemployed job searchers who  receive  an unemployment insurance benefit and unemployed
who  are on unemployment support.
Another advantage of our data set is that it covers a period, 1988-1994, in which no major
changes  in the definition of the variables involved occurred. The final major change in
defmitions  in unemployment, vacanties and unemployment outflow was in 1987. In that year
the official vacancy statistics were collected  based on a survey, which is argued also  to take
account of unreported vacanties, and there was a change in legislation with respect to the
unemployment insurance act. For more details on our data set we refer to Appendix 1.
3. THE ELASTICITY OF MATCHING
In this section  we wil1 show that different measures of matching, and hence different stocks
of job searchers, imply quite different values for the elasticities of matching. Assume that in
the labour market we have unemployed job searchers, decomposed into persons  on unem-
ployment insurance and on unemployment support, employed job searchers and job
searchers not in the labour force. Figure 1 presents the flows between the different labour
market states that are relevant in our study.
* Figure 1 somewhere here *
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In Figure 1, the unemployed with an unemployment insurance benefit, .U,  and the unem-
ployed on unemployment support, U,,  together build registered unemployment, UR. The job
searchers not in the labour force, or non-participants, are labelled  N.  Only a certain
proportion of this group searches for a job, mainly school-leavers and married women  re-
entering the labour market after  raising their children. Finally, E are the employed persons.
Also  in this group, there is a certain proportion looking for another job, leading to job-to-
job flows. This means  that .S=UR+&E+&IV,  where  O<&<l and i=(1,2).  Furthermore,
we assume that al1 inflow into E occurs by means  of filling a vacancy. The total inflow into
employment, or the total flow of tïlled vacanties, F, consists of the flow of unemployed on
unemployment insurance to a job, F,, the flow of unemployed on unemployment support
and non-participants to a job, F,, and the flow of employed finding  a another job, F,,.  This
means F= F, + F, + F,, . Based on earlier arguments, a matching function based on F,
should contain U as stock of job searchers, whereas a matching function based on F should
have S  as stock of job searchers.
The matching function (1) is usually specified  in a Cobb-Douglas form with constant returns
to scale.  So in terms of (1).  we find
F = csavl-a , (2)
where  CY  is the matching elasticity with respect to the stock of job searchers. It shows the
effect of job matches to a change in S  or V.
In terms of Figure 1, we can rewrite (2) as
F = c(U+X)~V'-~, (3)
where  X  is the stock of al1 job searchers except  those with an unemployment insurance
benefit. X consists of job searchers on unemployment support, employed job searchers and
job searchers not in the labour force. We assume that this stock X has a pro-cyclical
character. An economie  upswing implies favourable opportunities of finding  a job, so X wil1
increase. In a downturn  the opposite holds.  Suppose X  can also  be written in a Cobb-
Douglas form,
X = pUBE' (4)>
where  fi < 0, y > 0 and p is some scale  parameter.
Under these assumptions, the flow of unemployed to a job, F,, can be written as
Fa,  = sxF  = ( U(u+X)“-‘vl-‘” i.e.
Fau-=
u
E -L l-Ol,
( 1u+x
where  4  = cp  .
This implies that we can als0  rewrite (3) as
F u+x a-SC-.
V ( 1V
(5)
(6)
In genera1 terms, the matching function, based on (2) without assuming constant-returns-to-
scale,  can be specifkd as
F = c(U+X)"Vb i .e. ,
F = c(U+pUpEY)'Vb.
This enables US to write
dF F
au=a U+pUpEY
(l+ppUP-lEY).
(7)
(8)
So for the elasticity of matching with respect to unemployment, (i?F/aU)(UIF), this implies
aFu ,---CO:  -o( 1+BpU6-‘EY
dUF 1 +pub-'EY  '
From (9) it is easy to derive that CY*  < (Y if B < 1.
On the other hand, from (5) we can derive that
So in this case we find,
Fue = [U(U+pUsEr)'-'  Vb.
(9)
(10)
(11)
The elasticity of matching with respect to unemployment, (8F,IdU)(U/F,),  is
aFu? u
- -  = al * = a
au F,
02)
Elasticity (12) shows that a**>  CY  when  (1 + CY&~)/(Y  > 1. In other words, under the assump-
tion that (1-a) > 0, this implies that <r**>  CY  when  p < 1.
Hence, when  matches are represented by the flow of filled vacanties F and fi < 1, we find an
elasticity of matching with respect to unemployment of CY*<CY.  When  matches are repre-
sented by the flow of hires from unemployment to employment F, and /3 < 1, we find an
elasticity of matching with respect to unemployment of CY”>  CY.  This means  that CU**>  a*
when  /3<  1. Or, when  matches are respresented by the flow of hires from unemployment,
the matching elasticity with respect to unemployment is larger then the matching elasticity
with respect to unemployment in case matches are respresented by the flow of filled
vacanties. This proves our point made in Table 1 about the dichotomy in the matching
elasticities with different measures for job matches. The only condition we have to test is
whether /3  < 1.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The necessary condition under which the matching elasticity with respect to unemployment,
in case matches are hires from unemployment, is larger that the matching elasticity, in case
matches are the filled vacanties, is that /3<  1. This means  that the elasticity of al1 job
searchers, except  those on unemployment insurance, with respect to the number of persons
with an unemployment insurance benefit is smaller than unity.
This condition is likely to held, because X=S-U.  So if aX/aU=a(S-u)laU=aSlaU-1  <O  and
hence aSlaU<  1, then most certainly /3=(aX/aU)(U/X)<  1. Testing this premise means
testing whether the correlation between X and U  is negative. Another way is to estimate
equation (4) directly and test whether fl< 1.
The simple correlation coefficient between X and U is px.“=-0.67,  with a t-statistic  of 4.2,
which implies that /3<  1)  and in fact /3 < 0. The actual value of the elasticity /3 is determined
in Table 2, where  equation (4) is estimated for The Netherlands. We find that fi=-0.12,
with a t-statistic  of 1.74, hence fl is negative at a 10 percent significante  level. This
provides  ample evidente  for the differente  in matching elasticity for different measures of
matching, that was proved in the previous section.
* Table 2 somewhere here *
As a fmal part of this section,  we present the estimation results of the matching function
based on pooled cross-section time series, from 1988.2-1994. It concerns flow data based on
a number of sectors in the Dutch economy.  See also  Appendix 1 and 2. The outflow rate  of
persons  with an unemployment insurance benefit to a job is linked to the pool of unemploy-
ment insurance benefit recipients and the pool of vacanties. We assume a matching function
specified  in Cobb-Douglas form with constant returns-to-scale, as in equation (2).
l”g[Fue,i,Jui,~-~l  = Yi + OLilog(~,pl/ui,,-l)  + ‘l,i,JP (13)
where  E~,~  is an error term and index i refers to the sector involved (i=  1,. .,6).
If we take the flow of job matches to be equal to the flow of filled vacanties,  then the
associated pool of job searchers consists of employed job searchers, unemployed job
searchers and job searchers out  of the labour force. Adequate data on all of these three
stocks are not available. Obviously, we do have the pool of unemployed job searchers.
Based on Boeri (1995), we assume that a fixed proportion of 10 percent of the employed are
searching for another job and, based on scattered evidente  of Statistics  Netherlands, we
assume that 7 percent of non-participants actively search for a job. Finally, we assume that
workers in one sector search only for another job in the same sector. The stock of available
jobs is of course represented by the stock of vacanties. Assuming, like before, a Cobb-
Douglas form with constant-returns-to-scale,
l”g[Fi,,lsi,,-l 1 = Pi + P$%(v,,,-,Pj*,-,)  + E2&, (14)
where  Si is the stock of job searchers, pi is the matching elasticity per sector and E~,~  is an
error term.
The labour market efficiency for each sector in (13) is given by yi and in (14) by pi. This
equals logci+logpi and logci,  respectively, in terms of (5) and (3). In practice,  this means
that efficiency is represented by six sector dummies, in both specifications. That makes
equations (13) and (14) a so-called  fixed-effect model. In order to be able to give more
information, we wil1 also  include two additional variables representing heterogeneity
between job searchers on the labour market. The first  is a mismatch indicator, which equals
the absolute value of the residuals of a UV-curve regression, where  IogU  is regressed on
sector dummies and IogV.  This mismatch  indicator refers to shifts in the  UV-curve. For the
‘SV-curve’ a similar  measure is constructed, where  instead of U  the total number of job
searchers S  is taken. The second  variable we use is a measure for the number of long-term
unemployed in each sector. The more long-term unemployed, the less  is the outflow rate  of
unemployed. Since we have no information on the stock of long-term unemployed in each
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sector, we have used as an approximation the log of the ratio of persons  leaving the
unemployment insurance system because their maximum benefit duration has expired and the
total outflow out  of the unemployment insurance system. When  this ratio increases, this
means  that unemployed have a hard time finding a job and the outflow rate  wil1 fall.
Specification (13) and (14) contain group dummies for each of the six sectors. We first  test
whether this fixed-effect specification of (13) and (14) is correct or whether a random-effect
specification is more appropriate. A random  effect model has no group dummies, so in (13)
and (14),  yi=y, pi=p  and the error E~,~,,=Q~+u~,~,~, where  k= { 1,2},  q is a random  term and
u is an error term. We conduct a Hausman test on the nul1 hypothesis that the random-effect
model is the correct specification. For model (13),  we fïnd x2(8)=23.90,  which implies that
the fixed-effect model (13) cannot be rejected in favour of the random-effect model. For
model (14),  this test cannot be performed, because the estimated variante  of v2 is close to
zero. When  we take @;=fi,  it can be performed and yields x2(2)=5,66,  which is significant
at 6 percent. We wil1 specify both models in fixed-effect format.
The estimation results for matching model (13) are presented in Table 3. This Table shows
that the matching elasticities, with respect to vacanties, differ per sector. It is lowest for
construction with 0.13 and highest for non-commercial services with 0.31. Especially, the
latter sector seems to have a higher matching elasticity than the other sectors, who  are al1
around 0.2. Note that the insignificant positive value of our mismatch indicator is counter-
intuitive. An increase in long-term unemployment, however,  means  a fa11 in labour market
efftciency and thus in the matching rate,  as expected.
* Table 3 somewhere here *
Table 4 presents the estimation results of (14). Note that the matching elasticities with
respect to vacanties,  when  the flow of filled vacanties is used as dependent variable, are
much  higher  then those found for the flow of unemployed to a job. In Table 4 the elasticities
vary from 0.45 for construction, to 0.66 for commercial services 2. In this model, there is
no significant effect of long-term unemployed, but there is a positive effect of the mismatch
indicator, based on shifts in the SV-curve.
* Table 4 somewhere here *
Next, we conduct a test on the hypothesis of an equal matching elasticity for al1 sectors, i.e.
CY;=  CY  and a zero effect of mismatch  in the model of Table 3. This may also  affect the
1 0
efficiency as represented by yi. Conducting an F-test  on this parameter restriction yields
F(6,148)=2.14,  which is about equal to the 5 percent significante  level. Table 3 also  gives
this simplification. The overall matching elasticity for model (13) equals about 0.2.
A similar specification analysis can be applied to the model of Table 4. A test on the
equality of the matching elasticities for all sectors, &=/3,  and a zero effect of long-term
unemployment and mismatch, yields for this model F(6,130)=2.38, which is not significant
at 5 percent, but it is at 2.5 percent. In other words, there is a significant differente  in the
elasticities at the 5 percent level. The overall matching elasticity for model (6) is about 0.5.
Comparison with Table 1 indicates that the elasticity for model (13) is in line with the values
found by those studies who  have used the unemployment outflow or  the hires from
unemployment as a measure of job matches. In that case the stock of unemployed is the
relevant pool of job searchers. The elasticity found for model (14) is also  in line with the
values found by those studies who  have used total hires or  filled vacanties as a measure of
job matches. However,  in most studies, this measure of matches is related to the stock of
unemployed, while in fact  it should be related to unemployed, employed job searchers and
job searchers not in the labour force. It appears that the stock of unemployed serves as a
reasonable approximation for the stock of ah job searchers.
Finally, we report. in Table 5, the sectoral  differences in labour market efficiency for the
two models. If we normalize the efficiency of agriculture  to 1, we find that al1 other sectors
have lower  levels of efficiency for model (13). In the service sector the efficiency is about
half the value in agriculture.  For someone with an unemployment insurance benefit it is
easier to find a job in agriculture  than in the service sector. Note that the ranking of the
efficiency of commercial services 2 and non-commercial services has reversed when  moving
to the simplified  model. This indicates that it matters for the efftciency,  whether we apply
parameter restrictions to the model of Table 3 column 2.
For model (14), we find that the efficiency of matching in the non-commercial service sector
is highest, whereas in construction is lowest. The results imply that, for al1 job searchers, it
easier to find a job in the service sector than in the other sectors. Combining this result  with
what was found in the previous paragraph, implies that employed job searchers and job
searchers not in the labour force find a job in the service sector relatively easily, whereas
this sector is relatively closed  for unemployed job searchers. Note that the ranking in
efficiency between sector changes  dramatically here, when  the models  of Table 4 column 2
and column 3 are compared. This is because the hypothesis of equal matching elasticities
between sectors for this model could not accepted  at 5 percent.
*  Table 5 somewhere here *
1 1
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper studies the properties of the matching function, where  the measure of job
matches and the pool of job searchers are consistent with each other. When  we assume job
matches to be equal to hires from unemployment, we fïnd a matching elasticity witb  respect
to unemployment of 0.8 and with respect to vacanties of 0.2. When  we approximate
matches by the flow of filled vacanties, we find a matching elasticity with respect to the
entire stock of job searchers (and with vacanties) of 0.5. These results are in line with those
of Van Ours (1995),  where  a distinction is made between unemployed and employed job
searchers. There, the matching elasticity with respect to unemployment is about 0.6 when
matches equal the hires from unemployment. When  the matches of employed job searchers
are considered, the matching elasticity with respect to the stock of employed job searchers
equals some 0.3. The stock of employed job searchers is a fixed proportion of total
employment, like we assume in this paper.
Our study stresses  the importante  of other job searchers in the matching process  than
unemployed. Burgess (1993,1994)  already  pointed out  that employed job searchers build the
largest flow into employment and affect the standard matching approach substantially. We
argue that in a standard matching fùnction, the stock of job searchers should  correspond to
the origin of the flow of job matches. In many  studies, only the stock of unemployed job
searchers is used. This paper shows that when  job matches are associated with the flow of
unemployed to a job, the matching elasticity with respect to unemployment is larger than the
matching elasticity with respect to unemployment, in case matches are represented by the
flow of filled vacanties.
Our values of the matching elasticity imply that, when  the hiring rate  from unemployment
represents the matching rate,  an increase in layoffs, has a much  larger effect on the
matching rate  than an increase in vacanties. Stimulating labour demand,  by increasing the
number of vacanties, only has a minor effect on the hiring rate  from unemployment. On the
other hand, it does have a large effect when  the flow of filled vacanties represents job
matches. In other words. stimulating labour demand  leads  to increased job search by other
job searchers than unemployed. Many  of the vacanties, created as a cause  of stimulating
labour demand,  are fdled by employed job searchers and new entrants on the labour market.
This corresponds to results of other studies, like the Ministry of Social  Affairs (1993).
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Table 1. An international comparison of matching elasticities.
country Dependent
variable
data Elasticity
v u
Pissarides (1986) U K
Blanchard and Diamond  (1989) USA
Layard  et al. (1991) U K
Van Ours (1991) Netherlands
Burgess (1993) U K
Schettkat (1993) Germany
Burda and Wyplosz (1994) France
Germany
Spain
U K
Netherlands
Netherlands
Van Ours (1994)
Gorter and Van Ours (1994)
Anderson  and Burgess (1994) USA
Broersma  (1994) Netherlands
Antolin (1994) Spain
Van Ours (1995) Netherlands
Albzk  and Hansen  (1995) Denmark
Mumford  and Smith (1995) Australia
Eriksson and Pehkonen (1995) Finland
uo
H
H U
H O
uo
F
uo
H
H U
uo
uo
uo
uo
F
F
H
H N
H E
uo
uo
H U
H E
H N
H
H U
H O
uo
quarterl y 0.3 0.7
monthly 0.6 0.4l
monthly 0.2 0.6l
monthl y 0.2 0.6'
quarterly 0.3 0.7
annual 0.6 0.4
quarterly 0.4 0.6
annual 0.2 0.0
annual 0.2 0.7
monthly 0.3 0.7
monthly 0.3 0.7
monthl y 0.2 0.8
monthly 0.3 0.7
annual 0.6 0.4
annual 0.7 0.3
annual/panel 0.8 0.4
annual/panel 0.7 0.3
annual/panel 1.0 0.7
annual 0.3 0.7
annual 0.2 0.8
annual 0.3 0.7
annual 0.7 0.3
quarterly 0.3 0.7
monthly 0.3 0.3
monthly 0.1 0.6
monthly 0.4 -O.32
quarterly 0.2 0.8
Explanation:  UO  is unemployment outtlow (in some cases only males),  H is total hires, HU
is hires from unemployment, HO hires from out  of the labour force, F is filled vacanties,
HN is hires from non-employment, HE is hires from employment.
l The ‘unemployment’ pool is a combination of unemployed job searchers and job searchers
out  of the labour force.
’ Here, is ‘unemployment’ pool is the number person  not in the labour force.
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Table 2. Estimation results of equation (4).
The variables in equation (4) contain unit roots and cointegration between the three variables
cannot be rejected, as DW=0.82.  The simplified model in error-correction form is presented
below .
Alog(X,)  = 1.235 - 0.172 [ log(X,T,)  + 0.118 log(&) 1
(1.754) (-1.727) (1.743)
R’  = 0.865 (J  = 0.0151 DW = 1.719 T = 24 (1989.1-1994.4)
The long-term equilibrium relation between X and U  is given by the error-correction part,
1ogx  = -0.12 logU,
where  the coefflcient of IogU  equals the elasticity p.
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Table 3. Estimation results of matching function (13)
Dependent variable:
constant
group  dummies  D-
Dcon
D
CS1
QS?
DIK6
log of VU ratio,-,  for.
aggregate economy
-0.910 (-6.487)
-0.373 (-4.480)
-0.180 (-4.649)
-0.777 (-8.634)
-0.599 (-8.775)
-0.512 (-5.207)
-0.898 (-6.369)
-0.384 (-4.597)
-0.179 (-4.593)
-0.784 (-8.678)
-0.605 (-8.818)
-0.529 (-5.377)
agriculture 0.156 (7.634) 0.149 (7.402)
manufacturing 0.186 (6.975) 0.178 (6.744)
construction 0.132 (3.381) 0.129 (3.287)
commercial services 1 0.189 (5.798) 0.179 (7.744)
commercial services 2 0.220 (8.3 17) 0.202 (8.288)
non-commercial services 0.306 (6.108) 0.292 (5.827)
mismatch, 0.128 (1.686)
long-term unemployment, -0.170 (-4.131) -0.170 (-4.109)
-0.885 (-6.308)
-0.406 (-5.514)
-0.179 (-6.096)
-0.805 (-9.832)
-0.659 (-10.38)
-0.663 (-7.996)
0.176 (15.08)
-0.174 (-4.250)
________________________________________-------------------------- ____________________--------------------------- --
R’ 0.956 0.955 0.952
0 0.104 0.105 0.106
NxT 162 162 162
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Table 4. Estimation results of matching function (14)
Dependent variable: l”g(K,Jsi,t-l)
constant
group  dummies D-
Dcon
DCS1
QC
D“CS
log of VU ratio,-,  for:
aggregate economy
-1.670 (-6.557)
0.674 (2.961)
-0.014 (-0.059)
0.856 (3.295)
0.598 (2.217)
1.184 (3.463)
agriculture 0.511 (16.26)
manufacturing 0.631 (15.26)
construction 0.476 (13.42)
commercial services 1 0.513 (9.070)
commercial services 2 0.636 (14.33)
non-commercial services 0.668 (8.722)
mismatch, 0.474 (1.725)
long-term unemployment, -0.022 (-0.295)
___---------________------------------------------------------------- ____________________---------------------------
R? 0.974 0.974 0.970
u 0.127 0.128 0.133
NxT 162 162 162
17
-1.593 (-10.14) -1.409 (-14.96)
0.663 (3.043) 0.155 (3.281)
-0.018 (-0.058) 0.106 (2.503)
0.806 (3.461) 0.736 (13.82)
0.547 (2.037) -0.053 (-1.384)
1.106 (3.357) 0.497 (10.95)
0.540 (30.90)
0.504 (16.81)
0.630 (15.17)
0.465 (13.66)
0.502 (9.032)
0.624 (14.28)
0.652 (8.538)
Table 5. Sectoral labour market efficiency and 95 percent confídence interval
Sector” Model: Tabje  3 column 2 Table 3 column 3
Manufacturing
Construction
Commercial services 1
Commercial services 2
Non-commercial services
0.68 (0.58 - 0.80) 0.67 (0.58 - 0.71)
0.84 (0.77 - 0.90) 0.84 (0.79 - 0.89)
0.46 (0.38 - 0.54) 0.45 (0.38 - 0.53)
0.55 (0.48 - 0.63) 0.52 (0.46 - 0.59)
0.59 (0.49 - 0.71) 0.51 (0.44 - 0.61)
Sector” Model: Table 4 column 2 Table 4 column 3
Manufacturing 1.94 (1.27 - 2.97) 1.17 (1.06 - 1.28)
Construction 0.98 (0.64 - 1.49) 1.11 (1.02 - 1.21)
Commercial services 1
Commercial services 2
Non-commercial services
2.24 (1.42 - 3.53) 2.10 (1.88 - 2.32)
1.73 (1.02 - 2.92) 0.95 (0.88 - 1.02)
3.02 (1.58 - 5.75) 1.65 (1.51 - 1.80)
a Effkiency of agriculture  is normalized to 1.
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Figure 1. Flows into employment.
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APPENDIX 1. DATA: SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS
Fw,i Flow of persons  with unemployment insurance benefit to a job, for sector i.
source: Sociale verzekeringsraad, Het beroep op de Werkloosheidswet, omvang
en ontwikkizling  .
F Flow of filled vacanties for sector i
source: Centra1 Bureau of Statistics, Sociaal-economische maandstatistiek.
Number of persons  receiving unemployment insurance benefit, for sector i.
source: Sociale verzekeringsraad, Het beroep op de Werkloosheidswet, omvang
en ontwikkeling.
si Total number of job searchers, consisting of unemployed and employed job
searchers and job searchers not in the labour force: UR+c#&+&ZV,  where  we
implicitly  assume that unemployed and non-participant job searchers may apply
to any  sector and employed job search mainly  takes place  within the same
sector. Further, 4,  and & represent the fraction employed and non-participants
searching for a job, with +,=O.  10 and +,=0.07.
UR Registered unemployment, composed of both persons  with an unemployment
insurance benefit and persons  on unemployment support.
source: Centra1 Bureau of Statistics, Sociaal-economische maandstatistiek.
Ei Number of jobs in sector i.
source: Centra1 Bureau of Statistics, Sociaal-economische maandstatistiek.
N Number of persons  not in the labour force (non-participants), defined  as
POPl464-E-UR, where  POP1464 is the population of working age, i.e. between
14 and 64 years old and E is overall employment, or E=CE,.  POP1464 is
interpolated to give quarterly data.
source: Central  Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook.
vi Number of vacanties for sector i.
source: Centra1 Bureau of Statistics, Sociaal-economische maandstatistiek.
mismatch mismatch indicator, based on shifts in UV- or SV-curve, defined as fellows,
mismatch = ) ei,r  1,  where  ei,, comes  from the regression
l"g(ui,O  = Yi +  aiogVi.r  +  %.r or log(Si,,)  = yi + CrlogV,,,  + ei,,.
LTU measure of long-term unemployment, defined  as the log of the outflow from
2 0
unemployment insurance due to expiry of maximum benefit  duration (UO,J
and total outflow (UOtd3,  or  LTU = log(UO,,/UO,,J.
source: Sociale verzekeringsraad, Het beroep op de Werkloosheidswet, omvang
en ontwikkeling.
APPENDIX 2. SECTORAL  CLASSIFICATION
This Appendix describes the classification of the sectors we distinguish in terms of the SBI-
index in The Netherlands (similar to the SIC-classification). SB1  1, mining, and SB1  5,
public utility, have been omitted. The first is very smal1 in The Netherlands and the latter is
also  smal1 and more or  less constant over the period 1989-1994.
Sector SB1 Description
Agriculture 0 agriculture,  fishery
Manufacturing 213 manufacturing
Construction 5 construction and installation
Commercial services 1 6 and 8 hotels, restaurants, wholesale and retail trade,
banks, real  estate and insurance companies
Commercial services 2 7 transport, storage and communication
Non-commercial services 9 other (non-commercial) services, government
2 1
